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Thomas W. Merrill *
Modern interpretation of the Contract Clause of article 1, section 10 has created a
dual standard ofjudicial review that bottoms upon the classification of a particular
contract as public or private. However, which particular category has received greater
deference has changed depending upon the precedential climate. Within his Article,
Professor Merrill outlines three modern justifications for affording greater protection
to public obligations "Kantian theory, " "process theory, " and "utilitarian theory. "
He argues, however, that none of these theories adequately justify the dual standard
of review, and concludes that a unitary analysis of the contract clause that affords no
presumptions in favor of either public or private obligation should supersede the dual
standard entirely.
INTRODUCTION
FEW PROVISIONS OF the Constitution have experienced moredramatic ups and downs than the contract clause. The clause
attracted little attention at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 or
in the process of ratification.' But under the guiding hand of Chief
Justice John Marshall, the early Supreme Court construed the con-
tract clause as affording broad protection against state interference
with both private and public obligations.2 Indeed, in the days
before the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, the contract
* Deputy Soliciter General, U.S. Department of Justice; Professor of Law, Northwest-
ern University School of Law (on leave). I wish to thank Robert Bennett, John Donohue,
Mark Grady, Victor Goldberg, Carol Rose, and Andrew Rutten for their helpful suggestions
on earlier drafts. I also profited greatly from comments by the participants in a workshop
sponsored by Washington University. Except for minor editorial changes, this Article was
completed before I joined the Justice Department and of course reflect my own views which
are not necessarily those of the Department. Financial support was provided by the Stand-
ford Clinton, Sr., research professorship at Northwestern.
1. For example, the Federalist Papers devote only one paragraph to justification of the
contract clause. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282-83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
2. See generally B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 27-61
(1938); Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703
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clause was the second most frequently litigated provision of the
Constitution (after the commerce clause), and was the principal ve-
hicle by which the Supreme Court asserted federal constitutional
control over the state governments.3
Today, the contract clause is but a pale shadow of its former
self. With two exceptions,4 the Supreme Court has rejected every
contract clause contention that has come before it in the post-New
Deal era. Although the Court has never formally equated contract
clause analysis with the "rationality review" it applies to economic
legislation under the due process and equal protection clauses,5 the
tone of recent contract clause decisions approaches this same degree
of extreme deference.6 Surveying the general pattern of the modern
case law, it is difficult to quarrel with Justice Black's conclusion
that the Supreme Court has "balanc[ed] away the plain guarantee of
Art. I, § 10, that 'No State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .' "
Yet as we contemplate the demise of the contract clause, one
puzzling counter-trend stands out. In United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey8 one of two modern decisions upholding a contract
clause challenge, the Court announced that impairments of public
contracts, government obligations, would be subject to more search-
(1984); Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Prop-
erty-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1986).
3. B. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at xiii, 92, 95.
4. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (Minnesota law levying
a charge against the company's pension plan invalid under the contract clause); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (state statute repealing a covenant between a state
and bondholder violates the contract clause).
5. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (equal
protection); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1. 14-38 (1976) (due process).
6. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); Ex-
xon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 189-90 (1983) (the Court refused to "strain to reach a
constitutional question by speculating that the Alabama courts might in the future interpret
the royalty-owner exemption to forbid enforcement of a contractual arrangement to shift the
burden of the tax increase" and deemed the pass-through prohibition at issue, although re-
strictive of "contractual obligations of which appellants were the beneficiaries" as not falling
within the ambit of those activities which the contracts clause was intended to prohibit);
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416 (1983) (the
Court found that because the Energy Reserve Group "knew its contractual rights were sub-
ject to alteration by the state price regulation .... [Its] reasonable expectations ha[d] not
been impaired by the Kansas Act." ); cf Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Top. &
Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985) (expressly adopting rationality review in assessing federal
contract impairment challenge arising under the due process clause of the fifth amendment).
7. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1). Cf United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 29 (denying that this has
occurred).
8. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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ing judicial review than impairments of private contracts. Subse-
quent decisions have gone out of their way to reaffirm this
distinction between public and private obligations. 9 This dual stan-
dard of review-highly deferential where the state has impaired pri-
vate contracts, less deferential where the state has impaired public
contracts-reflects a curious inversion in constitutional doctrine.
For roughly the first 150 years of our constitutional history, the
contract clause was viewed as imposing greater restraints on impair-
ments of private rather than public contracts. Today, as we cele-
brate the Constitution's 200th anniversary, the Court has done an
about-face, and has announced that the clause protects public obli-
gations more than private obligations. What accounts for this curi-
ous transformation in the constitutional order?
In Part I, I will sketch the history of the relationship between
public obligations and private obligations under the contract clause,
and show that the dual standard of United States Trust is not only
of recent vintage, but also contrary to the views of the framers and
the contract clause jurisprudence that developed in the nineteenth
century. In Part II, I will outline three possible justifications for the
modem doctrine affording greater protection to public than to pri-
vate obligations-what I call the "Kantian theory," the "process
theory," and the "utilitarian theory." On close examination, none
of these justifications are very persuasive. In Part III, I will recon-
sider the dual standard of review in light of the general transforma-
tion in constitutional law that has taken place in the last fifty years.
Although this exercise ultimately yields an explanation for the dual
standard, it only compounds the doubts raised in Part II about
whether the dual standard is justifiable. In concluding, I will argue
that the Supreme Court should abandon the dual standard in favor
of a unitary analysis of the contract clause that affords no presump-
tions in favor of either public or private obligations.
9. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1235-36; Exxon, 462 U.S. at 192 n.13 ("The statutes under
review in United States Trust Co. also implicated the special concerns associated with a
State's impairment of its own contractual obligations."); Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412
n.14 ("In United States Trust Co., but not in Allied Structural Steel Co., the State was one of
the contracting parties.... In almost every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to
its contractual obligations when it enters financial or other markets."); Allied Structural Steel,
438 U.S. at 244 n. 15 (discussing the distinction between private and public contracts made by
the Court in United States Trust Co.); cf Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 472 n.24
(holding that the contract at issue was not a public contract, implicitly recognizing that if it
were, a different standard of review would apply).
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE DUAL STANDARD
Anniversaries inevitably call forth reflections on the past, and it
is appropriate to begin by tracing some of the high points in the
history of the relationship between public and private obligations
under the contract clause. That history contains, to say the least,
more than a little irony.
The origins of the contract clause are "shrouded in mystery."'
The clause was proposed by Rufus King in the waning days of the
Constitutional Convention, only to be defeated by a floor vote in
favor of the prohibition on ex post facto laws."1 After some confu-
sion over whether ex post facto laws included civil as well as crimi-
nal laws, the five-member committee on style apparently decided
that some further check on retroactive civil legislation was
needed.' 2 It inserted a new version of the contract clause in the
final draft of the Constitution, and, without further discussion by
the Convention, it became part of fundamental law.13
The paucity of recorded debate at the Convention or in the rati-
fication process makes it hard to know what the contract clause was
supposed to accomplish. Nevertheless, a fairly strong case can be
made that, whatever else it was intended to mean, the clause was
not thought to impose a general duty on state governments to honor
their own obligations. The clause was patterned after a provision in
the Northwestern Territory Ordinance of 1787, which by its terms
applied only to private contracts,1 4 and it was introduced by King
as "a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts."' 5
Moreover, when anti-federalists raised the possibility in the ratifica-
tion debates that the contract clause would apply to public debts,
these claims "were denied by members of the Convention, and their
denials were not challenged."' 6
The primary evidence in support of this conclusion, however, is
10. F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 271 (1985).
11. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439-40 (M. Farrand
rev. ed. 1937).
12. F. McDONALD, supra note 10, at 271-72.
13. Id. at 272; see also B. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 8-12.
14. Northwest Territory Ordinance and Act of 1787, art. II, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 51. 52
n.(a) (1789). "[I]n the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared,
that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner
whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without
fraud previously formed." Id.
15. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438 (M. Farrand rev.
ed. 1937).
16. B. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 16.
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the very absence of significant debate about the clause. Both the
Continental Congress and the states had accumulated an enormous
public debt during the Revolutionary War. Under existing political
arrangements, this debt was of questionable value; it circulated at
only a fraction of par, and was the subject of intense speculative
trading. 7 Indeed, one of the most controversial issues of the times
was whether these public debts would be honored or repudiated. 8
The framers finally dodged the whole issue of public indebtedness
with a "declaratory" statement to the effect that "[a]ll Debts con-
tracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation."' 9 Had the contract
clause been thought to establish the principle that state govern-
ments must honor their own obligations, it would have attracted
considerably more comment than it did.
Although the validity of public debt was highly controversial,
there appears to have been a much broader consensus that some
17. F. MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 94-95 (stating that certificates of public debt nor-
mally circulated at one-quarter to one-tenth of their nominal value); E. FERGUSON, THE
POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 252-53
(1961).
18. F. McDONALD, supra note 10, at 222-23. One powerful group that had an interest
in opposing full funding of stated indebtedness was land speculators. Most speculators in
western lands purchased property from state governments under long-term sales contracts
that permitted payment in public securities. Thus, property nominally worth one dollar an
acre could be purchased for ten to twenty-five cents per acre, provided the public securities
continued to be deeply discounted. But if state paper was suddenly worth par, or close to par,
these speculators would suffer significant losses. F. MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 94-95; E.
FERGUSON, supra note 17, at 339. Because large numbers of influential citizens engaged in
land speculation, one would expect to find vocal objection to a clause that would have en-
forced repayment of public debts.
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1. The provision is described as "merely declaratory" in
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 1, at 278 (J. Madison). In 1790, Alexander Hamilton
engineered a program calling for federal assumption of the state war debts, and federal fund-
ing of war debts, both state and federal. This action, of course, provided handsome profits to
those who had purchased public securities at deep discounts. Charles Beard cited this as
circumstantial evidence in support of the thesis that the Constitution was designed to advance
paper money interests at the expense of agrarian interests. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTER-
PRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 32-40 (1913). But the Constitution itself only created the
political mechanism for funding of war debts. Nothing in the text or the ratification debates
suggests that this was an inevitable development. Moreover, although the final plan adopted
by Congress funded the debt at par, it delayed the payment of interest on a portion of the
debt-an action that would have to be considered an impairment of contract. See Murray v.
Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 443-46 (1878). Consequently, the settlement of 1790 cannot be
interpreted as "confirming" either that the Constitution was a conspiracy of money men, or
that the contract clause established the constitutional principle that states must honor their
own debts. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 1129-69 (J. Gales ed. 1790); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1324-
95, 1526-70, 1575-98, 1638-75 (J. Gales ed. 1790).
19871
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restraint should be imposed on the states' power to impair private
obligations. The Confederation years had witnessed not only the
depreciation, and even repudiation of public securities, but also a
rash of private debtor-relief legislation, including stays or postpone-
ments of debts, provisions allowing debts to be paid in installments,
and statute allowing debts to be paid in commodities.2" As Chief
Justice Marshall later put it, "The mischief had become so great, so
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and
threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people,
and destroy the sanctity of private faith."2 1 The most plausible ex-
planation for the inclusion of the contract clause in the Constitution
is that it was designed to prevent states from enacting these types of
statutes for the relief of private debtors.22
Given the probable understanding of the framers, it comes as a
mild surprise to find that the first contract clause case to reach the
Supreme Court, Fletcher v. Peck,23 involved the impairment of a
public contract. The Georgia legislature, induced by massive brib-
ery, had sold what is today most of Alabama and Mississippi for
about one and one-half cents per acre.24 When the deal was ex-
posed, aroused Georgians elected a new legislature, which promptly
rescinded the original grant. Peck was a New England land specu-
lator who had acquired some of the transferred lands. He in turn
had transferred a portion of his holdings to Fletcher by a deed
which, curiously enough under the circumstances, contained ex-
press warranties of Peck's good title, including a warranty that the
rescinding act of the Georgia legislature was invalid. Fletcher
promptly sued Peck in a federal diversity action, alleging breach of
these warranties.
20. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 454-65 (1934) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting); THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 1, at 65 (A. Hamilton); B. WRIGHT, supra
note 2, at 4-6.
21. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 355 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
22. My own view is that the framers' intent ought to be the foundation of constitutional
interpretation, but that this does not necessarily mean that courts are bound by the specific
intentions of the framers on matters not addressed by the constitutional text. Rather, I would
construe the framers, use of broad language in the Constitution as a delegation of power to
federal courts to make law, provided that law-making remains within the confines of the
chosen language, and is guided by what can be ascertained about the framers' purposes. See
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 59-70 (1985).
23. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
24. See generally C. MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC:
THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966). Magrath argues that, given the wild state of the
land and the difficulties of dealing with Indian claims, the price was not necessarily unfair.
Id. at 15.
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In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court de-
clared that the rescinding act was an unconstitutional impairment
of contract. The decision raises a number of fascinating issues: the
lawsuit was undoubtedly collusive; difficult questions were raised
about the scope of judicial inquiry into the motives of a legislature;
and it was awkward to describe a completed grant of property as a
contract.25 For present purposes, however, the importance of the
decision lies in the express holding that public contracts are pro-
tected by the contract clause no less than private contracts.26 Mar-
shall noted that the language of the Constitution draws no
distinction between public and private contracts; that other provi-
sions of article I, section 10, such as the ex post facto clause, clearly
apply to acts of states, and that the provision of article III allowing
states to be sued in federal court implied, at least prior to the enact-
ment of the eleventh amendment, that states could be sued for im-
pairment of their own obligations.27 Marshall further argued that
applying the clause to public contracts was consistent with the gen-
eral purpose of the clause, which he described as an effort to shield
property rights "from the effects of those sudden and strong pas-
sions to which men are exposed." '28
Whatever its rationale, Fletcher clearly elevated public obliga-
tions to parity with private obligations for purposes of contract
clause analysis. This holding was to have a profound effect on the
future course of American history, as the clause was subsequently
held to apply to various forms of nineteenth century "new prop-
erty," such as tax exemptions 29 and corporate charters.30
The next important chapter in the history of the public/private
contract distinction begins with Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge.31 In general form, the case involved a fact pattern substan-
tially similar to Fletcher. At time T1, the legislature made an im-
plied promise designed to induce reliance on the part of X. At time
25. See generally D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-
1888, at 128-36 (1985).
26. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139.
27. Id. at 137-39.
28. Id. at 138.
29. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812) (legislature's declaration that
Indian land was exempt from taxation is covered by contract clause and therefore not voida-
ble by subsequent legislative act).
30. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (char-
ter granted to college trustees is covered by contract clause and therefore legislative act alter-
ing the charter is an unconstitutional impairment of a contract).
31. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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T2, the legislature changed its mind and reneged on this promise,
thereby upsetting Xs expectations. In Fletcher, the original action
was a grant of land, which the state implied it would not rescind,
followed by a rescission. In Charles River Bridge, the original ac-
tion was the grant of a charter to build a toll bridge connecting
Boston and Charleston, which the state implied was to be exclusive,
followed by the grant of a charter to another company to construct
a free bridge.
Chief Justice Taney, writing for the Court, framed the question
in terms of presumptions: when a corporate charter does not ex-
plicitly say that it is exclusive, do we presume it to be exclusive or
non-exclusive? His answer: "any ambiguity in the terms of the con-
tract, must operate against the adventurers, and in favor of the pub-
lic, and the plaintiffs can claim nothing that is not clearly given
them by the act."32 Justice Story penned a lengthy dissent in which
he cited considerable common law authority to the effect that the
presumption against implied grants applied only to gratuitous privi-
leges, not to public grants supported by consideration, such as the
bridge.33
The Taney-Story debate is a classic exposition of the perennial
conflict between the need for stability of entitlements, on the one
hand, and the need for flexibility and modification of entitlements in
light of changed circumstances, on the other. For present purposes,
however, the chief significance of the decision is that it modifies the
parity between public and private obligations introduced by
Fletcher. Henceforth, public obligations were to be strictly con-
strued in favor of the promisor-the state. There was no sugges-
tion, however, that such a rule of construction would apply to
private obligations. Thus, after Charles River Bridge, both public
and private contracts were still protected by the contract clause, but
there was now a dual standard of review, with public contracts en-
joying less protection than private contracts.
Other doctrinal innovations soon emerged that further eroded
the protection afforded to public contracts. Under the so-called re-
served powers doctrine, the state, by reserving the right to "repeal,
alter, or amend" corporate charters, could rescind any promise
made to incorporators without incurring any contract clause liabil-
32. Id. at 544 (quoting Proprietors of the Stourbridge Canal v. Wheeley, 109 Eng. Rep.
1336, 1337 (K.B. 1831)).
33. Id. at 588-603 (Story, J., dissenting).
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ity.3 4 Under the so-called inalienable powers doctrine, the state was
deemed to have certain powers-such as eminent domain and the
police power-that it was completely powerless to "contract
away." 35 Although technically neither doctrine was limited to pub-
lic contracts, 6 in practice their impact was largely confined to such
obligations. Thus, the reserved and inalienable powers doctrines re-
inforced the dual standard of review introduced by Charles River
Bridge, with public contracts being granted less protection than pri-
vate contracts.3 7
We must move forward to the darkest days of the Great Depres-
sion before we perceive a crack in the relationship between public
and private obligations established after Charles River Bridge. The
precipitating event was a series of measures taken in 1933 by the
newly-elected President Roosevelt which had the effect of taking the
United States off the gold standard.38 In June of that year, Con-
gress passed a joint resolution declaring all contracts providing for
the payment of deferred obligations in gold or in the equivalent
value of gold to be "against public policy." This action was taken in
anticipation of a devaluation of the dollar that eventually occurred
in January 1934. The purpose of the resolution, apparently, was to
avoid certain windfall gains and losses that would otherwise follow
upon such a devaluation.39 If the same amount of gold were sud-
denly worth many more dollars than before, then creditors holding
rights to payment in gold or gold equivalent would experience a
windfall gain, and debtors required to make payments in gold or
34. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 58-60, 84-86, 168-78.
35. Id. at 195-213.
36. Chief Justice Marshall, dissenting in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
339 (1827), had suggested how the reserved powers notion might affect private contracts: if
the state passed a general statute indicating that all private contracts entered into in the
future "should be discharged as the legislature might prescribe," then this reservation of
power would immunize the state from any contract clause limitations. Marshall was correct
in theory, but no state has enacted such a statute-at least not yet. Moreover, the inalienable
powers doctrine also prevents private parties from contracting around certain sovereign pow-
ers of the state, such as the power of eminent domain or the police power. See Hudson Water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908) ("One whose rights.., are subject to state restric-
tion, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them.").
37. For an excellent analysis of nineteenth century contract clause doctrine that empha-
sizes the preferred status of "ordinary" contracts, including all private contracts, relative to
corporate charters and other "privileges," see Siegel, supra note 2.
38. See generally Buchanan & Tideman, Gold, Money and the Law: The Limits of Gov-
ernmental Monetary Authority, in GOLD, MONEY AND THE LAW (H. Manne & R. Miller,
eds. 1975); Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of
American Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504 (1983).
39. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 314-16 (1935).
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gold equivalent would experience a windfall loss. President
Roosevelt was evidently anxious to avoid such sudden shifts in
wealth.4°
In the Gold Clause Cases,4 the Supreme Court, by a vote of five
to four, upheld the joint resolution against the allegation that it rep-
resented a taking of property without just compensation in violation
of the fifth amendment. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the
Court, drew a sharp distinction between the application of the joint
resolution to contractual obligations of private corporations and
state and municipal governments, and the application of the resolu-
tion to the obligations of the United States. As to the former, the
resolution was found to be an appropriate exercise of congressional
power "[t]o coin money [and] regulate the value thereof...""
Hughes implied that no private contractual understanding would be
entitled to constitutional protection in the face of a proper exercise
of this power.43
As to the obligations of the United States, however, Hughes sug-
gested that congressional power was much more limited. He wrote:
There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to
control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they
interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the
power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its
own engagements when it has borrowed money under the au-
thority which the Constitution confers.... To say that the Con-
gress may withdraw or ignore that pledge, is to assume that the
Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a pledge having no
other sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor.
This Court has given no sanction to such a conception of the
obligation of our Government."
Notwithstanding this sharp condemnation of any attempt by the
40. The President stated that he wanted "to prevent unfair profits from accruing to a
very small group of creditors and the placing of unfair burdens ... on the corresponding
debtors." Proclamation No. 2072 (Jan. 31, 1934), quoted in Dam, supra note 38, at 521. For
a discussion of whether the gains and losses were in fact "unfair," given that bonds contain-
ing gold clauses generally paid lower interest than bonds without such clauses, see id. at 525-
29.
41. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. and United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S.
240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330
(1935). Justice McReynolds, joined by Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler filed a
dissent applicable to all four cases under the name Gold Clause Cases, 294 U.S. 361 (1935).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
43. See Norman, 294 U.S. at 309-10 ("There is no constitutional ground for denying to
the Congress the power expressly to prohibit and invalidate contracts although previously
made, and valid when made, when they interfere with the carrying out of the policy it is free
to adopt.").
44. Perry, 294 U.S. at 350-51.
[Vol. 37:597
CONTRACT CLAUSE'S DUAL STANDARD
United States to renege on its own obligations, the claims of the
United States' creditors were also denied, on the dubious ground
that they had failed to prove any damages.4 5
The Gold Clause Cases could not have had an impact on the
development of the contract clause. The cases were not decided
under the contract clause, but under the fifth amendment. The
Court has never "incorporated" the contract clause into the fifth
amendment,46 in the manner, for example, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment has been applied in cases aris-
ing under the fifth amendment. Moreover, the obligation of the
United States to honor its own debts can be independently
grounded in section 4 of the fourteenth amendment-which again
does not apply to the states.47 Finally, because the Court ultimately
denied the claims of even the United States' creditors, the sugges-
tion that public contracts are entitled to greater protection than pri-
vate contracts could be regarded as dictum.48 Indeed, by the end of
the 1960's, when judicial protection of "mere" economic rights had
fallen to its lowest ebb, the Gold Clause Cases had all but disap-
peared from sight. In a case involving a challenge to the attempt by
the State of Texas to impair its own contractual obligations, the
Court did not discuss the Gold Clause Cases and analyzed the issue
as if it were the same as an impairment of a private contract.4 9
It remained for the modem Supreme Court, in United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey,5 ° to reincarnate the dual standard implicit
45. The Court reasoned that since private hoarding and trading in gold had been made
unlawful, there was no way to determine the market value of a promise to pay in the
equivalent value of gold. Id. at 357-58. Note that this escape route was available to the
Court only because it had implicitly held, in the context of discussing the impairment of
private contracts containing gold clauses, that Congress could constitutionally suspend the
right of private citizens to buy and sell gold. Thus, although the Congress could not impair
its own obligations, when it impaired everyone else's obligations, it simultaneously created
the conditions ratifying its own impairment.
46, See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Top. & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451,
472 (1985); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984); cf
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (relying in part on contract clause authority in
striking down the United States' impairment of war insurance policies).
47. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 4 provides: "The validity of the public debt of the
United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and boun-
ties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned." Chief Jus-
tice Hughes had referred to this clause in the Gold Clause Cases. See Perry, 294 U.S. at 354.
As noted above, see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text, the original Constitution
ducked the question whether the United States was obliged to honor its debts.
48. See Perry, 294 U.S. at 359-60 (Stone, J., concurring).
49. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
50. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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in the Gold Clause Cases. That case involved bonds issued by a
bistate agency, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
By way of statutes, both states had promised the agency's bond-
holders that certain revenues from bridge and tunnel tolls would
not be used to subsidize mass rail transportation. This covenant
was subsequently repealed, at first only as to future bond issues, and
then retroactively as to existing bonds. The trustee for the existing
bondholders sued to have the repealing acts set aside.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held
that retroactive repeal of the statutory covenant violated the con-
tract clause.5 The Court observed that the contract clause does not
prohibit every impairment of contract. If the impairment falls
within the reserved or inalienable powers categories, it is constitu-
tionally permissible.52 Moreover, "[a]s is customary in reviewing
economic and social legislation, an impairment may be constitu-
tional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose. ' 53 This last statement sounds much like the formulaic
standards applied in equal protection or substantive due process
cases. But then the Court added a new twist. Where public, as
opposed to private, contracts are involved, the Court stated:
complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness
and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is
at stake. A governmental entity can always find a use for extra
money, especially when taxes do not have to be raised. If a State
could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to
spend the money for what it regarded as an important public
purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at
all.54
The only case authority cited by the Court for the proposition that
impairment of public contracts should be subjected to a stricter
standard of review than impairment of private contracts was the
Gold Clause Cases."
The dual standard of review, first broached in the Gold Clause
Cases and then adopted by the Court in United States Trust, appar-
ently strikes a highly responsive cord in today's Supreme Court.
The notion that public contracts should be given greater judicial
protection than private contracts has been picked up and repeated
with approval in every subsequent case involving the contract
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 21-22 (reserved powers of the state); id. at 23-25 (inalienable powers).
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id. at 26 n.25.
[Vol. 37:597
CONTRACT CLAUSE'S DUAL STANDARD
clause.56 With this development, the modem Court has in effect
turned the contract clause of both the framers and the post-Charles
River Bridge era on its head. The prior understanding was that pri-
vate contracts were protected from state interference with more
rigor than public contracts. As we enter the final decades of the
twentieth century, private contracts are given less protection than
public contracts. Given this remarkable inversion in the under-
standing of the contract clause, it is important to consider what jus-
tification or justifications the Court has advanced for the new dual
standard.
II. JUSTIFYING THE DUAL STANDARD
Neither the Gold Clause Cases, nor United States Trust, nor the
recent decisions reaffirming United States Trust provides a very
clear rationale for giving greater protection to public than to private
contracts. Nevertheless, the language of these cases suggests three
possible justifications for the dual standard of review. I will call
these justifications the "Kantian theory," the "process theory," and
the "utilitarian theory." I will describe each of these theories in
turn, and suggest some reasons why none is very persuasive.
A. The Kantian Theory
The Kantian justification for the dual standard is deceptively
simple. It begins with the proposition that it is morally wrong to
repudiate one's own promise. Given that it is wrong to repudiate
one's own promise, it is wrong for the government to impair its own
contract. The opprobrium that attaches to such an act is simply not
present, at least not to the same degree, when the government
adopts legislation that impairs someone else's promise. Fundamen-
tal principles of morality therefore require that impairments of pub-
lic contracts be reviewed more carefully than impairments of
private contracts.
The Kantian theory emerges most clearly in the Gold Clause
Cases. According to the Court, when Congress abrogated gold
clauses contained in bonds issued by private corporations and state
and municipal governments, it was not repudiating its own promise.
Rather, it was exercising its sovereign authority to establish a uni-
form monetary policy for the United States. Private and local gov-
ernmental contracts, the Court reasoned, cannot be allowed to
56. See United States Trust Co.. 431 U.S. at 1.
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frustrate congressional monetary policy, and Congress could rea-
sonably find that the widespread use of gold clauses in such con-
tracts would frustrate its policy.5 7 But when Congress abrogated
gold clauses set forth in the United States' own financial instru-
ments, it was undermining "the highest assurance the Government
can give, its plighted faith."58 As applied to its own obligations, the
joint resolution was an act of "repudiation, with all the wrong and
reproach that term implies . . .,,9
One could perhaps quarrel with the premise of the Kantian ar-
gument that it is morally wrong to repudiate one's own contract.6"
Holmes' famous dictum to the effect that a contract is not a promise
to perform, but a promise to perform or pay damages61 suggests
that the institution of contract rests as much or more on considera-
tions of utility or efficiency as on the morality of promise-keeping.
Morever, recent decades have witnessed a sharp decline in belief in
freedom of contract, and one could argue that this reflects an ero-
sion in the perceived moral force of obligations based on consent.62
For purposes of discussion, however, I will assume that it is wrong
to repudiate one's own contract. Even so, this does not provide a
very persuasive basis for discriminating between impairment of pub-
lic and private obligations.
57. The last link in this argument is highly debatable. As previously noted, the gold
clauses would affect the distribution of wealth after devaluation, but they would not appear to
interfere with the devaluation itself, nor would they necessarily lead to hoarding or exporting
of gold, at least as long as gold clauses were interpreted to require payment in the equivalent
value of gold rather than gold specie. See Dam, supra note 38, at 518-19; Buchanan &
Tideman, supra note 38, at 35-41.
58. Perry, 294 U.S. at 351.
59. Id. (quoting Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878)); see also id. at 352-53
(quoting Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934)). The Court's moral indignation is
doubly ironic. First, the simple syllogism that sustained the joint resolution as applied to
private, state, and municipal contracts was also fully applicable to the obligations of the
United States, and the Court never explained why Congress could not reasonably conclude
that gold clauses in United States' financial obligations also "frustrated" its chosen monetary
policy. Second, the Court adopted a clever argument for getting the United States off the
hook anyway-finding that the holders of United States bonds with covenants to pay in gold
or gold equivalent had not proven any damages. The Court's moral indignation thus has a
distinctly hollow ring. Id. at 357-58.
60. See generally C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981) (developing the argument that contracts are binding because promises
are morally binding).
61. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
62. See, e.g., P. ATIAGH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 726-764
(1979) (discussing British experience); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 483-96
(1985) (discussing the scholarship of Fredrick Kessler). cf. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT (1974) (noting the trend to assimilate contract law into the law of torts).
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First, the goverment can participate in promise-breaking both
directly, as promisor, and indirectly, as the agent of some other (pri-
vate) promisor. Although it may be worse in some sense for the
government to engage in promise-breaking directly, the difference is
a matter of degree rather than of kind. The point can be illustrated
by reference to an analogous argument raised in debate over the
death penalty. If we believe in the moral principle that no life
should be taken deliberately, then the government should never be a
party to the premeditated killing of a human being.63 By refusing to
engage in premeditated killing, the argument runs, the government
both respects fundamental moral principles and sets an example
that will inspire correct moral behavior on the part of its citizens.
Analogously, if we believe in the sanctity of promises, the govern-
ment should never repudiate its own promises. By strictly following
this principle in its own affairs, the state again adheres to fundamen-
tal moral law and inspires its citizens to be faithful to their own
obligations.
But the death penalty analogy is incomplete. If premeditated
killing is wrong, we not only would want the government to desist
from taking life itself, we also would want the government to refrain
from licensing one private party to engage in the premeditated kill-
ing of another. By licensing private executions, the government
would in effect be aiding and abetting-and encouraging by exam-
ple-the very action which we condemn. Similarly, if the moral law
requires that promises be kept, the government should not only ad-
here to its own promises, it should not license private parties to
break their promises either. By passing a statute impairing private
contracts, the government participates in the same conduct indi-
rectly. Moreover, the picture of the government rigidly fulfilling its
own contracts, but acting as an open shop for the repudiation of
private contracts, is clearly not one designed to communicate the
message that promises should be kept. Kantian morality would
therefore seem to require not only that the government refrain from
impairing its own promises, but that it not impair private promises
either.'
63. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, 352-53, 369-70 (3d ed. 1982).
64. Indeed, the distinction between "repudiation" of promises and "regulation" of
promises, which is central to the argument of the Gold Clause Cases, does not generally turn,
as the Court suggested, on the source of the promise. In ordinary language, "'repudiation"
generally refers to an action taken with the specific purpose of nullifying an obligation-
public or private. "Regulation," at least in this context, refers to an action taken for some
other purpose that indirectly affects an obligation-again, public or private. Accordingly, it
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Second, if the government must keep its own promises, one of
the promises it presumably must keep is the guarantee of article I,
section 10 of the Constitution which provides that the government
will not impair the obligation of contracts. Whatever else this pro-
vision means, it was originally intended to include private con-
tracts.65 Thus, the Kantian principle itself would seem to require
that the government respect private obligations as well as public
obligations, because the government has promised to respect private
obligations in the contract clause.66
In short, the Kantian argument for the dual standard is underin-
elusive. The Kantian idea provides a justification for the contract
clause. Indeed, it provides a justification for the move made in
Fletcher, extending the protection of the clause to public obligations
as well as private obligations. But the Kantian rationale supplies at
best a weak rationale for systematically granting greater constitu-
tional protection to public than to private contracts.
is perfectly correct to speak of the government adopting a policy of "repudiating" private
obligations. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934).
This principle precludes a construction which would permit the State to adopt
as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of
means to enforce them. But it does not follow that conditions may not arise in
which temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and
purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of
the reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community.
Id.
On the other hand, it is also perfectly correct to speak of the government adopting a
"regulation," such as an expansion of the money supply or a change in tax rates, that indi-
rectly affects its own contracts. The distinction between repudiation and regulation thus
turns not on the source of the obligation, but on the government's purpose in undertaking the
impairing action. A similar distinction is drawn in the law of eminent domain between regu-
lation and taking of property. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Debenedictis, 107
S. Ct. 1232 (1987); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978)
(application of city landmark statute to bar development of property was deemed a permissi-
ble regulation of property); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922)
(statute that prohibits mining where surface owners do not own support rights constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of property). Indeed, the distinction is implicitly present in any ac-
count of the contract clause (or the takings clause) that recognizes an exception for legitimate
exercises of the police power. See Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 730-40 (1984).
65. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
66. The argument is complicated by the fact that the contract clause appears in the
federal Constitution and yet it binds only the state governments. See supra note 47; J. NO-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAl. LAW 462 nn.l, 2 (2d ed. 1983) (the
contract clause is not "appl[icable] to the federal government"). But given that the original
thirteen states ratified the Constitution, that the other states agreed to uphold the Constitu-
tion upon being admitted to the Union, and that state officers regularly swear to uphold the
Constitution as part of their oath of office, it seems fair to say that the states have themselves
promised to abide by the contract clause.
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B. The Process Theory
In general, process theory attempts to judge the constitutional-
ity of government action, not on the basis of the outcome reached,
but rather by asking whether fair procedures were followed in
reaching that outcome. For process theorists, the hallmark of pro-
cedural fairness is adequate representation. Thus, the central com-
mand of the Constitution is said to be that individual interests must
be fairly and adequately represented in adjudicatory proceedings
before courts or administrative agencies, and that group interests
must be fairly and adequately represented in proceedings before the
legislature. 7 As applied to the contract clause, "process review
would inquire whether political processes provided all groups inter-
ested in challenged legislation with an effective means of represent-
ing their interests."68
A fundamental tenet of the fair process theory is that disputes
should be resolved by those who do not have an immediate financial
stake or interest in the outcome. Although this procedural axiom is
most often invoked in adjudicatory contexts, it has also been ad-
vanced as a criterion for fair legislation. James Madison wrote in
his justly-famous Tenth Paper of The Federalist:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a
body of men, are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same
time; yet, what are many of the most important acts of legisla-
tion, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning
the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large
bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators,
but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine?69
The principle that the legislature should not sit in judgment of
its own cause suggests a second possible justification for the dual
standard of review. When the government impairs a private obliga-
tion, it has no direct stake in the outcome, and hence can act as a
fair and impartial arbiter between conflicting interests. But when
the government impairs its own contract, it is acting as the judge of
67. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-104 (1980) (developing a "representation
reinforcing" theory of the Constitution); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV.
197, 235-55 (1976) (discussing the judicial development and enforcement of procedural
norms for political processes).
68. Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1638-
39 (1980). "In contract clause cases, process review would require the legislature to give full
consideration to the interests of the cost-bearing group." Id. at 1639.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 79 (J. Madison).
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its own cause, and thus cannot decide the issue in a neutral manner.
In United States Trust, the Court appeared to endorse this rationale
for the dual standard. As the Court put it, when the state impairs
its own obligation "complete deference to a legislative assessment of
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's
self-interest is at stake."70
As in the case of the Kantian theory, it is possible to question
the premises of the process theory. Why should the contract clause
be interpreted in light of the concept of fair representation? On its
face, the clause appears to be concerned with a substantive value-
the protection of contractual obligations-not with fair proce-
dures.7" When the framers were concerned with fair procedures,
they knew how to express themselves, as when they adopted special
protections for the right to jury trial, or the right not to be tried
twice for the same crime. No such intention appears on the face of
the contract clause. More fundamentally, it may be that it is impos-
sible to interpret the Constitution in purely procedural terms, with-
out invoking, at least implicitly, some set of substantive rights and
obligations."2 Nevertheless, as before, I will accept, for purposes of
argument, the premise that the contract clause should be construed
in light of the process theory, with its emphasis on fair representa-
tion. As in the case of the Kantian theory, however, when we ex-
amine the conflict-of-interest idea more closely, the distinction
between public and private obligations begins to blur.
70. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26 (emphasis supplied). Curiously, although the
Yale Note advocating a process theory approach to the contract clause endorses the dual
standard of review, it does not do so on the ground that the government has a conflict of
interest. Note, supra note 68, at 1647-49. Rather, the argument seems to be that when the
government impairs public obligations, it should be aware that it is frustrating reliance inter-
ests, but when it impairs private contracts it may or may not be aware that it is frustrating
reliance interests. As in the case of the Kantian argument, however, this appears to confuse
the source of the contract with the government's "mental state" at the time of the impairing
action. If the government enacts a general regulation (e.g., of the money supply) that indi-
rectly interferes with public obligations, why should we presume that the government had
perfect knowledge of all reliance interests that would be frustrated by its action? On the
other hand, if the government intentionally modifies or prevents the enforcement of private
obligations, why should we not presume that the government is fully aware that it is frustrat-
ing previously-formed expections?
71. See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 & n.8 (1980) (citing the contract clause as an example of "substantive"
rather than "procedural" protection).
72. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61-145 (1982)
(discussing value judgments which may be implied outside the written Constitution); Tribe,
supra note 71. But see J. ELY, supra note 67, at 92 ("the original Constitution was princi-
pally... dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to identification and preserva-
tion of specific substantive goals and values.").
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To be sure, there is a core of truth in the central insight of the
process theory-that the legislature will not be wholly impartial
when someone proposes to impair a public contract. How could it
be otherwise? The legislature is centrally involved in the affairs of
the state, and its members will surely attend carefully to arguments
concerning the status of its own obligations. But the legislature
may be similarly subject to a conflict-of-interest where private obli-
gations are concerned. In this regard, it is instructive to read fur-
ther in the passage from The Federalist No. 10 quoted above:
[W]hat are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and
parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed
concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors
are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice
ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and
must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or,
in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to
prevail.73
Madison's point seems to be this: If we think of the legislature as a
body of individuals, each of them representing private interests and
themselves having private interests, then it is obvious that the legis-
lature can potentially have a conflict of interest when it impairs pri-
vate contracts. If the majority of legislators represent debtors (or
creditors), or if the majority of legislators are themselves debtors (or
creditors), then how can the legislature act impartially when a pro-
posal is made to impair private debts?
Of course, it is also possible that the legislature would have a
conflict of interest when it impairs public obligations. The legisla-
tors might be anxious to rid themselves, as representatives of the
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 79-80 (emphasis supplied). Madison's
argument occurs in the context of discussing the causes of factions, which are presumably the
same at both the federal and the state level. (Madison identified these causes as "diversity in
the faculties of men," which leads to unequal distribution of property, and "zeal for different
opinions" concerning politics and religion. Id. at 78-79.) With respect to containing the
effects of factions, however, Madison probably would not prescribe the same remedies for the
two levels of government. Madison argued that the effects of factions could be controlled at
the federal level because of "the greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over
which the latter may be extended." Id. at 82. Because of this greater sphere, there would be
a "greater variety of parties and interests" making it "less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;" and it would be
more difficult for those who share the same factional interest "to discover their own strength
and to act in unison with each other." Id. at 83. At the state level, however, there will tend
to be fewer factional interests and lower costs of collective action. Thus, the Madisonian
analysis suggests that the effects of factions are apt to be worse at the state level than the
federal level. This is one possible reason why the states were forbidden to enact legislation
impairing contractual obligations, whereas no such limit was imposed on the federal
government.
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public, of an onerous public debt. But it is also possible that a ma-
jority of the legislature, as representatives of those holding govern-
ment bonds or as holders of government bonds themselves, might
be anxious to secure the payment of the government debt. 74 The
point is that once "the legislature" is seen, not as a hypostatized
entity having its own distinct interests, but as a collection of flesh
and blood individuals having disparate interests and representing
persons having disparate interests, then the conflict of interest point
is by no means unique to public obligations. Moreover, as applied
to public obligations, the conflict of interest problem does not neces-
sarily favor impairment. It might just as easily bias the legislature
against impairment.
Furthermore, the "fairness" of the process by which the legisla-
ture decides whether or not to impair a contract is not exclusively,
or even primarily, a function of whether the government, as an en-
tity, is interested in the outcome. Legislators respond to signals
from a variety of sources including the administration, the media,
their constituents, their contributors, and various and sundry lobby-
ists. The "access" of different groups to the legislative process will
depend on a variety of factors, such as the size of the group, how
well its interests are defined, how well it is organized, and the
number of electoral districts in which it has a presence.75 When
these additional factors are considered, it is not at all clear that
those holding government obligations are less likely to get a "fair
hearing" before the legislature than are those holding private obli-
gations.76 In fact, from this perspective, the process theory becomes
quite indeterminant. Certainly, it becomes problematic to state
that, as a general matter, the process that leads to the impairment of
74. Charles Beard, of course, claimed that the framers' ulterior motive was to secure the
payment of government debts at par. See C. BEARD, supra note 19, at 149-51. The Beard
thesis has been heavily criticized, however, in part because of lack of evidence and because it
ignores the latent conflict between holders of government debt and land speculators who
planned to pay for their land in depreciated government paper. See F. MCDONALD, supra
note 10, at 94-95. See generally ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (L. Levy
ed. 1969).
75. See, e.g., M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF THE POLITICAL
MARKETS (1981); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 135-65 (1965); Acker-
man, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726-28 (1985) (hypothesizing the
varying political pressures exerted by diffuse and concentrated groups of minorities).
76. Social security recipients, for example, have been held to have no contractual rights
vis-a-vis the government, Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec., 106 S. Ct. 2390,
2398-99 (1986), Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608 (1960), and yet they have been highly
successful in avoiding any reduction in benefits.
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public contracts is less fair than the process that leads to the impair-
ment of private contracts.
In sum, the process theory explanation for the dual standard,
like the Kantian theory explanation, is underinclusive. The process
theory suggests that the legislature may not be able to determine in
an impartial manner whether to impair a public obligation. But
similar considerations suggest that the legislature may not be an
impartial arbiter when someone proposes to impair a private obliga-
tion. Thus, the process theory provides only a weak foundation for
greater judicial scrutiny of public contract impairments.
C. The Utilitarian Theory
The third justification for the dual standard of review is utilita-
rian. This theory reflects the notion that courts should give greater
protection to public contracts in order to increase public confidence
in the government. Although the point can be generalized to a wide
variety of government promises, it is illustrated most easily with
respect to government bonds and other financial obligations. If
courts refuse to permit governmental entities to impair their finan-
cial obligations, this will enhance the security of government debt.
The greater the security of government debt, the lower the rate of
interest the government will have to pay to borrow money. The less
interest the government must pay, the less revenue it will have to
raise in taxes. Thus, although politicians might find it expedient in
the short run to consider reneging on particular financial obliga-
tions, in the long run taxpayers will be better off if there is a consti-
tutional rule, strictly enforced by the courts, that forbids attempts
to impair government obligations.
The utilitarian theory is hinted at in the Gold Clause Cases as
well as in several more recent opinions." But its most prominent
advocate is Professor Tribe. As he puts it:
For its own purposes, a government may find it convenient,
sometimes indeed imperative, to signal its trustworthiness and
thus to induce the sort of reliance that it could instead have
spurned. When government makes that choice, a powerful argu-
77. Hughes intimates the utilitarian theory when he theorizes that allowing Congress to
"disregard the obligations of the Government at its discretion" would render the credit of the
United States "an illusory pledge." Perry, 294 U.S. at 350. Blackmun hints at it in United
States Trust when he emphasizes the "special status of a State's financial obligations .... "
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26. Finally, this theme is also stressed in more recent
opinions, where it has been noted that "In almost every case, the Court has held a govern-
mental unit to its contractual obligations when it enters financial or other markets." Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.14 (1983).
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ment may be advanced that the most basic purposes of the im-
pairment clause, as well as notions of fairness that transcend the
clause itself, point to a simple constitutional principle: govern-
ment must keep its word.78
As with the Kantian and process theory arguments, one can
question the validity of the underlying premise of the utilitarian the-
ory: that politicians will be tempted to repudiate government obli-
gations in order to secure short-term gains that produce larger long-
term losses. The behavior of governments, like most large institu-
tional borrowers, is carefully monitored by credit-rating agencies
like Moody's and Standard and Poor's. If a particular government
entity, such as the bi-state agency involved in United States Trust,
decides to repeal a security provision in its bond agreements, and
this decision would materially impair the security of its outstanding
bonds, then the monitoring agencies will lower the government's
credit-rating.79 A lower credit rating will translate almost immedi-
ately into higher costs of borrowing. If the additional borrowing
costs are high enough, and if they come quickly enough to affect the
same generation of politicians who decided to impair the security
provision, the problem posited by the utilitarian theory should be
largely self-correcting.80
Again, however, I will assume for the sake of argument that the
utilitarian argument has identified a genuine "prisoner's dilemma,"
a situation where there is a strong temptation for actors to "defect"
in the short run, even though the optimal long-run strategy would
be to "cooperate."'" Nevertheless, even on this assumption, the
utilitarian argument does not support giving greater protection to
public than to private obligations. The basic problem is the same as
that encountered with respect to the Kantian and process theories:
78. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 470 (1978) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted). Tribe's formulation of the argument, by referring to "notions of fair-
ness," also has overtones of the Kantian argument.
79. In fact, abrogation of the security provision in the Port Authority bonds did not
change their rating, which suggests that the security provision was not material. United
States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19. Alternatively, of course, the rating agencies may have
thought that the repeal would be declared unconstitutional, and so they discounted its
significance.
80. Justice Brennan made this argument in opposition to the dual standard in United
States Trust. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 61-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., J. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 19, 21, 47, 120 (1979); R. HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-30 (1982). Strictly speaking, the "game" is here being played be-
tween debtors and creditors, not between the legislature and either or both of these parties.
In drawing the analogy to game theory, I am assuming that the legislature simply acts as an
agent executing the decisions of the principals (although in the case of public contracts, the
legislature is in a sense both the principal and an agent).
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on close examination, the destinction between public and private
contracts disappears.
First, the propensity of politicians to trade short-term gains for
long-term losses affects private obligations as well as public obliga-
tions. Just as the legislature that impairs public contracts will re-
quire the government to pay higher interest rates in the future, and
thus will impose higher taxes on future taxpayers, so the legislature
that impairs private contracts will require private borrowers to pay
higher interest rates in the future (or to pay other costs designed to
offset greater risks). The analysis is exactly the same in both cases:
the greater the uncertainty of repayment, the higher the rate of in-
terest demanded by creditors.82 In both cases, "defection" is a
more costly strategy than "cooperation," but defection will prevail
over cooperation unless the parties are constrained in some manner
by application of the contract clause. Indeed, it is possible to push
this line of inquiry one step further and ask, in which context is the
legislature more likely to ignore long-term costs: when the effect of
impairment is to raise taxes, or when the effect is to impose higher
interest charges on a diffuse collection of future borrowers? It is not
implausible to suppose that the temptation to defect will, if any-
thing, be stronger where private contracts are involved than where
public obligations are concerned.
Second, although the utilitarian argument supports the sanctity
of contract when the government "enters financial or other mar-
kets,"83 not all public contracts are so clearly utilitarian. In the
private sphere, there are obvious examples of nonutilitarian con-
tracts, such as contracts for murder or contracts in restraint of
trade. Surely we would not want the contract clause to prohibit
regulation of these sorts of agreements. Similarly, the history of the
contract clause suggests that many public contracts are of dubious
utility. The facts of Fletcher v. Peck and Charles River Bridge sug-
gest one type of problem. An even more striking illustration is pro-
vided by the history of the Crescent City Company, a stockyard and
82. Indeed, the two phenomena-higher interest rates and higher taxes-may have
more than a theoretical equivalence. Consider, for example, the probable effect of legislation
postponing foreclosure on farm loans. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding mortgage moratorium against contract clause challenge).
Private lenders would undoubtedly respond to such legislation by demanding a higher rate of
interest on future loans to farmers. These higher interest rates would in turn lead to demands
for federal loan programs, loan subsidies, or loan guarantees. Taxpayers could thus end up
paying the bill either way.
83. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.14
(1983).
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slaughterhouse operation granted a statutory monopoly in New Or-
leans by the Reconstruction-era Louisiana legislature.8 4 This par-
ticular public contract was made in 1869 and effectively repealed in
1879, when a new state constitution was adopted prohibiting mo-
nopolies. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court held
that the original contract did not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment." In Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,86 the Court
held that the repeal did not offend the contract clause.8 7 In effect,
the Court held that such monopolies are revocable licenses. They
may be granted by the legislature, but the legislature is free to re-
voke them at any time.
What would be the utilitarian rule with respect to monopoly
charters such as that given to the Crescent City Company? Would
it be, as Justices Marshall and Story would probably maintain, that
the charter is a property right, protected against subsequent impair-
ment by the contract clause? Would it be, as the Court held, that it
is a revocable license? Or would it be the position of Justices Field
and Bradley, dissenting in the Slaughter-House Cases, that such
charters are void ab initio, that is, that the government has no
power to create them in the first place?88 Many economists would
probably maintain that Field and Bradley had the right approach,
and that government-sponsored monopolies should be treated no
differently than private contracts in restraint of trade. In any event,
the history of the Crescent City Company hardly supports the prop-
osition that it is always utilitarian to enforce public contracts more
vigorously than private contracts.
In the end, the utilitarian justification for the dual standard is
both underinclusive and overinclusive. Moreover, like the previous
theories, it provides a justification for extending the protections of
that clause to at least some public contracts. But again, as in the
case of the Kantian theory and the process theory, it does not sup-
port a general rule giving public obligations greater protection than
private obligations.
84. See Franklin, The Foundation and Meaning of the Slaughterhouse Cases, 19 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 23-28 (1943).
85. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81-83 (1873).
86. 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
87. Id. at 752-54.
88. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 87-89 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 119-
21 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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III. EXPLAINING THE DUAL STANDARD
Whether considered in isolation or cumulatively, the stated jus-
tifications for giving greater protection to public than to private
contracts seem too weak to support the Supreme Court's resound-
ing endorsement of the dual standard. In this section, I will con-
sider whether, if it cannot be justified, the dual standard can at least
be explained in terms of broader trends in constitutional law. The
dual standard made its first appearance in the Gold Clause Cases, on
the eve of a historic confrontation between President Roosevelt and
the Supreme Court that is widely regarded as an important turning
point in modern constitutional law. Perhaps then the dual standard
can at least be rendered comprehensible if we think of it as part of
the general transformation in constitutional law that has occurred
in the last fifty years.
Although it is a commonplace notion that constitutional law has
undergone significant changes since roughly 1937, there are several
different ways of characterizing these changes. Most of these char-
acterizations appear to offer no explanation for the dual standard.
There is at least one possible characterization, however-what I
will call the "death of contract" theory-that can help to make
sense of the dual standard. Before turning to that model, however,
I will consider other, more common, characterizations of the trans-
formation of constitutional law, and will indicate briefly why I
think they lack explanatory power.
First, the transformation in constitutional law is often described
in terms of a shift from judicial activism to judicial restraint.8 9
Before 1937, in the Lochner era9° the federal courts are considered
by some to have engaged in impermissible activism by striking
down legislative reforms without having any clear constitutional
mandate for doing so. After 1937, with only occasional relapses,
courts have generally respected the decisions of the majoritarian in-
stitutions in areas where there is no textual justification for judicial
intervention.
It is debatable at best whether the contrast between judicial ac-
tivism and judicial restraint captures the distinction between the
Lochner era and the present.9 ' Whatever its general merit, how-
89. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
90. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
91. As the controversy surrounding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) suggests, "activ-
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ever, the distinction clearly fails to explain either the demise of the
contract clause or the rise of the dual standard. Unlike Lochner
substantive due process, which has been described as a constitu-
tional oxymoron, 92 the contract clause has a highly secure source in
the constitutional text-article I, section 10. Moreover, unlike sub-
stantive due process, which was at odds with the Court's initial in-
terpretation of the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, 93 the
contract clause had been construed almost from the beginning as a
potent limitation on state economic regulation.94 Thus, the dual
standard cannot be ascribed to a shift from judicial activism to judi-
cial restraint, but understood as a movement toward greater fidelity
to the constitutional text.
Second, the contrast between the Lochner era and the present is
often described as a turn from judicial preoccupation with "eco-
nomic rights" to solicitude for "civil rights" (also variously de-
scribed as "human rights" or "individual rights"). 95 According to
this view, the central lesson of Lochner is that it is dangerous and
ill-advised for courts to get involved in controversies about eco-
nomic theory.96 Economic issues, it is argued, have no principled
answers, at least none that can be discovered by the judicial
method. So these matters are best left to legislatures and adminis-
trative agencies. Civil rights issues, in contrast, do have principled
answers that can be determined, or at least discussed, in the lan-
guage of litigation. The constitutional transformation of the last
fifty years, in this view, represents a gradual judicial awakening to
this fundamental insight.
Whatever its merits as a normative standard,97 the economic
rights/civil rights dichotomy also fails to explain the dual standard.
Both private contracts and public contracts generally involve what
would be considered economic rights. Thus, if the transformation
of the last fifty years were simply a matter of judicial preoccupation
ism," defined as the lack of fidelity to the constitutional text. is still very much a live issue.
See generally J. EIY, supra note 67; M. PERRY, supra note 72.
92. J. ELY, supra note 67, at 14-18.
93. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
94. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
95. See M. PERRY, supra note 72; J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 60-128 (1980).
96. This is the argument of Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Lochner, 198 U.S. at
74, which is today invariably portrayed as the better view.
97. The distinction has been attacked from both the right, see M. FRIEDMAN. CAPITAl.-
ISM AND FREEDOM, ch. 1 (1962), and the left, see Reich, The New Property. 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964).
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with civil rights at the expense of economic rights, one would expect
courts to give equal deference to impairments of private and public
contracts. The emergence of the dual standard suggests that this
has not happened, or at least that the economic rights/civil rights
distinction does not tell the whole story.
Finally, the constitutional transformation can be described as a
shift from protection of "private rights" to advancement of "public
values."'9 8 Under this view, courts in the Lochner era used the Con-
stitution as a shield to protect common law property and contract
rights against legislative inference. Today, common law property
and contract rights are regarded as appropriate subjects for legisla-
tive regulation, and the Constitution is regarded as a sword for the
furtherance of public rights-rights derived not from common law
but from legislative programs or judicial interpretation of broad
constitutional guarantees. This characterization of the change in
public law since 1937 can explain a number of developments. Some
examples include the demise of the public use limitation on the
power of eminent domain,99 the decline of the nondelegation doc-
trine, t00 the expansion of standing, 1°' the extension of procedural
due process rights, 00 the increased use of Section 1983 as a means
98. See Jafi'e, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1265 (1961); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administration Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1671-76 (1975); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1984 Sup. CT.
REV. 177, 179-89 (1984).
99. See Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 68 (1986).
100. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-88
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
101. The old understanding was that standing to sue was largely, if not entirely, limited
to those who alleged the deprivation of some common law right of liberty or property. To-
day, citizens who assert statutorily-created and defined rights not having any common-law
analogue also frequently have standing. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982) (anti-discrimination group has standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1982)); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (unincorporated association of
law students have standing to sue the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1982)).
102. The old understanding was that due process required the state to provide a hearing
before impinging upon an individual's liberty or property rights. See Southern Ry. v. Vir-
ginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933) (state statute requiring installation of overhead rail crossings on
the order of an administrative officer violates procedural due process because no notice or
opportunity for hearing were provided for); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (right
to file objections to increased tax assessments does not satisfy the due process requirement
without notice and opportunity for a hearing). State-created rights, in contrast, were viewed
as "privileges," and were afforded no independent constitutional procedural protection. See
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (public rights have no claim to article III protec-
tion); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951) (due process does not require that employee of the federal government be
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of regulating state and local government affairs,1 1 3 and the use of
"structural injunctions" by federal courts to supervise hospitals,
prisons, and school systems.' °4
More significantly for present purposes, this characterization of
the constitutional transformation may better explain the dual stan-
dard of review under the contract clause. Clearly, the idea of the
constitution as a shield for the protection of private rights seems
consistent with the nineteenth century interpretation of the contract
clause. Consequently, legislative impairment of private contracts
was subject to rigorous judicial oversight."°5 The public contracts,
in contrast, were viewed as the domain of special privileges and mo-
nopoly preferences; accordingly, legislatures were given fairly wide
latitude, either through the doctrine of strict construction, or
through the reserved and inalienable powers doctrines, to overturn
existing public contracts.10 6 Today, the courts' perception of con-
tractual reality has reversed. With respect to private contracts,
market failure is presumed to be a pervasive problem, requiring that
states be given broad leeway in policing private contracts. Public
contracts, in contrast, viewed as devices for furthering legitimate
public policy goals such as "[m]ass transportation, energy conserva-
tion, and environmental protection,"' 0 7 may be viewed as much
more valuable than they were in the nineteenth century. Thus, pub-
lic contracts, as a necessary element in the regulatory and redistrib-
utive activities of the administrative state, arguably may have
become more important than private contracts, and are therefore
entitled to greater judicial protection.
On closer examination, however, the private rights/public val-
ues distinction also fails as an explanation for the dual standard.
When the legislature impairs a private contract, the contractual ob-
ligation is clearly a "private right," and the decision to impair the
contract presumably reflects "public values." Thus, a judiciary that
granted a hearing before being dismissed). Today, state-created rights are referred to as "'new
property," and are often given equal or even greater procedural protection than are conven-
tional rights of private property. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits
are a statutory entitlement that cannot be terminated without prior notice and hearing).
103. E.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (City of New York
liable under § 1983 for back pay of female employees forced to take maternity leaves before
medically necessary).
104. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judi-
cial Legitimacy, 91 YA i:t L.J. 635 (1982).
105. See generally Siegel, supra note 2.
106. Id. passim.
107. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 28 (1976).
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views public values as being superior to private rights would be in-
clined to defer to the legislative decision to impair the contract. But
when the legislature impairs a public contract, both the contractual
obligation and the decision to impair presumably reflect public val-
ues. The original obligation was authorized, either directly or
through delegation, by the legislature. However, the decision to im-
pair the obligation is also authorized, directly or indirectly, by the
legislature. Thus, it is not clear how, if at all, the judicial attitude
toward impairment of public contracts would change if the judici-
ary came to perceive public values as worthy of greater judicial pro-
tection than private rights.108
Fortunately, there is another characterization of the constitu-
tional transformation, related to and yet distinct from the third,
that finally seems to provide an explanation for the dual standard.
The change in constitutional law can be seen as part of a general
jurisprudential transformation that Grant Gilmore has described as
"the death of contract."10 9 In this view, the legal system of the
Lochner era was predicated on a belief in individual accountability
and freedom of contract.' 10 Consequently, contractual obligations
undertaken by consenting adults were entitled to great judicial so-
108. Actually, the matter is slightly more complicated. If the judicial attitude toward
impairment of private contracts shifted from strongly anti-impairment to strongly pro-impair-
ment, while the attitude toward impairment of public contracts remained basically un-
changed, this would yield an alternation in the relative status of private and public
obligations. Public contracts would stand higher relative to private contracts than before.
But the private rights/public values dichotomy still does not permit one to predict the emer-
gence of the modern dual standard. It would all depend on where the judiciary stood with
respect to the impairment of public contracts before the inversion in attitudes toward private
contracts took place. If the judiciary took a generally permissive attitude toward impairment
of public contracts before the transformation, then the inversion in attitudes about private
contracts might leave public contracts on a par with private contracts. Indeed, if as the
framers apparently intended, the judiciary viewed the contract clause as imposing no re-
straints on impairment of public contracts, then even after the inversion private contracts
would end up higher on the totem pole than public contracts.
109. See G. GILMORE, supra note 62, at 95-96. See also Priest, supra note 62.
110. This is confirmed by comparing Lochner with other cases of the same era that up-
held legislative interferences with liberty of contract. In Lochner, the Court struck down a
statute limiting the hours of bakery workers, observing: "Statutes of the nature of that under
review, limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living,
are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not saved
from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the exercise of the police power... "
198 U.S. at 61. However, when the Court encountered statutes limiting the contractual free-
dom of children, e.g., Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913); women,
e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); or employees in industries, such as mining, where
there was little perceived contractual choice, e.g., Holdin v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); it
generally upheld the restraint. In the latter situations, the Court did not find the paradigm of
individual autonomy applicable.
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licitude. Today, the legal system is based on a view of individuals
not as autonomous actors responsible for their own decisions, but as
holders of certain prescriptive rights and obligations not subject to
contractual modification. In common law terms, we have moved
from a regime of contract to a regime of tort; in public law terms,
we have gone from a philosophy of laissez faire to the philosophy of
the welfare state.
At first it might seem that the contract/tort version of the con-
stitutional transformation cannot account for the dual standard any
more than the other versions. After all, the dual standard says that
at least some kinds of contracts-government contracts-are still
entitled to a significant degree of judicial protection, and this seems
to suggest that at least some kinds of contracts are not, at least for
purposes of constitutional analysis, "dead." But at a deeper level,
the demise of constitutional protection for private contracts, com-
bined with the rise of a new level of protection for government con-
tracts, is consistent with the death-of-contracts model. All that is
necessary to make the dual standard fit this model is to posit that
public contracts are not "really" contracts, in the sense of bar-
gained-for exchange between consenting actors, but rather are a
species of government "entitlements." If public contracts are seen
from the perspective of the promisee as a form of entitlement, then
they become part of the general package of tort-like ascriptive rights
and obligations that finds such favor with modern courts.
Do modern courts in fact view public contracts as "entitle-
ments?" At least one line of cases-those concerned with defining
the dimensions of procedural due process rights-suggests that they
do. Beginning with Perry v. Sindermann ... in 1972, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that public contract rights are "prop-
erty" for purposes of due process. Thus, the government cannot
breach its contract without affording the promisee a proper hearing.
Significantly, however, the Court has steadfastly refused to apply a
traditional contract analysis to determine what sorts of procedures
are required. The promisee is not limited to the procedural rights
he bargained for in entering into the contract." 2 Instead, the Court
has taken the existence of a public contract as an occasion for pre-
scribing what the Court considers to be an appropriate package of
procedural protection for the promisee.' 1 3 This suggests that public
111. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
112. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. For criticism of the Court's noncontractual approach see Easterbrook, Substance
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contracts, no less than welfare benefits or antidiscrimination laws,
are viewed as public entitlements entitled to special judicial
protection.
In short, the dual standard can be explained in terms of the
death-of-contract interpretation of the general transformation in
constitutional law. One aspect of that transformation is a decline in
the idea of freedom of contract. This is reflected in the evisceration
of the contract clause as it applies to private obligations. Another
aspect of the transformation is the rise of entitlements theory. This
is reflected in the enhanced judicial protection given to public con-
tracts, viewed as part of the package of rights the citizen has against
the government. Indeed, it is possible, if present trends are not re-
versed, that the contracts clause will come to be viewed as having
little or no bearing on legislative interference with private contract
and property rights. Instead, the clause will be used as the substan-
tive equivalent of the new property hearing rights, providing addi-
tional protection to government licensees, job-holders, and grant
recipients beyond whatever rights may be spelled out by statute,
regulation, or public contract.
CONCLUSION
Although it is possible, with some effort, to construct an expla-
nation for the dual standard, we are still left with the problem of
justification. To say that contract is dead and tort ascendant, and
that the Supreme Court has come to view public contracts as a form
of entitlements, can render the emergence of the dual standard com-
prehensible as a matter of intellectual history. But it does not, at
least to my mind, answer the demand for a justification.
It is ironic that about the same time legal commentators were
declaring the death of contact, and the Supreme Court, in United
States Trust, was officially adopting the dual standard, officials of
the Carter Administration were launching an aggressive program
urging the deregulation of much of American industry. The prem-
ise of the deregulation movement, which accelerated during the
early Reagan years, is that private markets-based of course on pri-
vate contracts-work much better in allocating resources than does
public regulation. Indeed, it is interesting that in many of the areas
where contract clause controversies have been most prominent-
such as the oil and gas and surface transportation industries-the
anid Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 85; Williams, Liberty and Properly: The Problem of
Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983).
1987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
intellectual case for deregulation has generally been considered to
be the strongest. This would suggest that private contracting
should work relatively well in these industries, and that the effi-
ciency costs of public regulation would be correspondingly high.
There is another reason why the institution of contract is prefer-
able to a regime of tort. Modem public choice literature has em-
phasized the dangers of "rent-seeking" inherent in any system
where the government uses its power to compel the transfer of re-
sources from one person or group to another." 4 The potential for
wasteful competition is clearly enhanced if private contracts may be
set aside in favor of a system of ascriptive rights and obligations."1 5
Although the terminology of public choice is new, the insight is not.
As Madison wrote in The Federalist:
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy
which has directed the public councils. They have seen with re-
gret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interfer-
ences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands
of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the
more industrious and less informed part of the community. They
have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link
of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being
naturally produced by the efforts of the proceeding. They very
rightly infer therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting,
which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a gen-
eral prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the busi-
ness of society." 
6
And which clause or provision of the Constitution elicited this pas-
sage? The contract clause, of course. Madison's diagnosis of the
political ills of the day was very close to the modern analysis offered
by public choice theory. The protection of previously-formed con-
tracts against subsequent impairment was seen as a healthy antidote
to the rent-seeking problem then. There is no reason to think that
this analysis is any less valid today.
My own view is that the Court should eschew sweeping pre-
sumptions in favor of public contracts as opposed to private con-
tracts, or for that matter, in favor of private contracts as opposed to
public contracts. Instead, the contract clause should be applied by
asking, in any given context, whether the institution of contract is
114. See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan,
R. Tellison & G. Tullock eds. 1980); Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle,
81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1561 (1986).
115. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 714-17.
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 1, at 282-83 (J. Madison).
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more or less likely to advance the welfare of society than is a regime
of public regulation. In other words, I would implement the con-
tract clause by asking the courts to engage in a modest exercise in
comparative institutional analysis. 1 7  In some contexts, private
contracting should work reasonably well-better at least than pub-
lic regulation-and in these contexts the contract clause should be
enforced. In other contexts, public contracting may work well, in
which case the contract clause should be available to protect against
subsequent impairment of public contracts. Similarly, in some con-
texts private contracts are subject to high rates of failure, at least
relative to public regulation, and in these circumstances we should
permit contracts to be regulated. And of course, public contracts in
some contexts can be problematic, in which case we would again
want the state to be able to undo the promises of the past.
There are two powerful reasons why private and public con-
tracts should be restored to an even playing field. First, it would
restore continuity with our constitutional past. We are all familiar
with the phenomenon of constitutional law evolving into something
either much broader or narrower than was perhaps originally con-
ceived. But it is one thing to countenance "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn."' 1 8 It is quite an-
other to contemplate a judicial doctrine which has moved 180 de-
grees from both the original understanding and the first 150 years of
our constitutional history. Although it is probably too late to re-
turn to the framers' expectation that public contracts would receive
no protection under the contract clause, it is not too late to restore
private contracts to at least equal status under the law.
Second, both private and public contacts should be protected
against most forms of subsequent impairment. As the discussion in
Part II suggests, there are good reasons to protect public contracts
against later impairment, and these same reasons extend also to pri-
vate contracts. The insights of the deregulation movement and of
117. See generally Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U. Ci. L. REv. 366 (1984). The point is a familiar one in law-
and-economics literature: what is needed are not sweeping generalizations but hard-headed
analysis of the merits of markets versus regulation in different institutional settings. See
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960); Demsetz, Information and
Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1969). See also Epstein, Judicial Re-
view: Reckoning on Two Kinds ofError, 4 CATO J. 711 (1985) (level of judicial protection of
economic rights should be determined by comparing error rate of judiciary and legislature).
118. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). The Court was
speaking of the evolution of securities law, but the metaphor is equally apt with regard to
constitutional law.
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public choice theory only reinforce these considerations. The con-
tract clause is not an extreme measure, like Lochner's substantive
due process, that would bar any form of government regulation,
whether or not the parties have previously settled their respective
rights and obligations by contract. It has long been limited to inter-
ference with existing contractual obligations. 19 Given that the par-
ties have already contracted, the only substantial justification for
government intervention is to protect the rights of third parties who
were not privy to the bargain. Today's dual standard, which essen-
tially permits any private contract to be set aside upon a finding of a
legislative "rational basis," promises not only to "impair commer-
cial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the
morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith."12
119. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
120. Id. at 355 (dissenting opinion).
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